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HE present survey period' was an active time in the development
of Texas tax law. The 68th Legislature enacted many new or re-
vised tax statutes and the Office of the Comptroller of Public Ac-
counts (the comptroller) adopted many changes to the administrative rules
interpreting those statutes. In addition, both the comptroller and the
courts issued a number of significant decisions in Texas tax controversies.
The United States Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the property tax
applicable to banks2 and the imposition of property taxes upon goods tem-
porarily stored in customs warehouses in Texas before shipment to foreign
countries. 3 These developments, along with several miscellaneous tax
matters, are briefly addressed in this Article.
I. LIMITED SALES, EXCISE, AND USE TAX
The Texas appellate courts rendered no decisions in this area during the
survey period.4 The legislature, however, enacted several changes to this
tax. For example, it increased the amount of annual taxable sales neces-
* A.B., University of Miami; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Office of the Comptroller of
Public Accounts in providing information on certain pending tax cases discussed throughout
this Article.
1. In general, Oct. 15, 1982, to Oct. 15, 1983. In addition, the author has included
certain significant developments that occurred shortly before or after that period.
2. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 103 S. Ct. 3369, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072
(1983); see infra note 166 and accompanying text.
3. Xerox Corp. v. Harris County, 103 S. Ct. 523, 74 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1982); see infra note
169 and accompanying text.
4. Several trial court decisions rendered in sales tax cases are, however, currently on
appeal. See, e.g., Bullock v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 663 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984,
no writ) (characterization of sale-leasebacks as mortgages or sales for resale); East Tex. Oxy-
gen Co. v. Bullock, No. 13893 (Tex. App.-Austin, argued Sept. 7, 1983) (whether refillable
gas tanks are exempt from sales tax because purchased for resale); Payless Drugs v. State,
No. 13770 (Tex. App.-Austin) (sales and use tax collections); American Cotton Growers v.
Bullock, No. 335183 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Tex., Oct. 21, 1983)
(tax exemption for machinery and equipment used to process and pack agricultural prod-
ucts); MBI, Inc. v. Bullock, No. 339348 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53rd Judicial Dist. of
Tex., Nov. 7, 1983) (inclusion of freight charges in sales price used to calculate sales tax);
Mel Powers Inv. Builders v. Bullock, No. 300843 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial
Dist. of Tex., Mar. 28, 1983) (tax exemption for aircraft); Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Bullock,
No. 337343 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Tex.) (exemptions for com-
mon carriers).
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sary to qualify for a direct payment permit from $200,000 to $800,000.-
Existing direct payment permit holders may retain their permits until can-
celled by the comptroller. 6
The legislature added several statutory exemptions to the sales and use
tax during the survey period. New exemptions include the following:
(a) bins used exclusively as containers to transport fruit or vegetables from
the place of harvest to a processing, packaging, or marketing location; 7
(b) certain health care supplies that enable the blind to function more in-
dependently; 8 (c) items sold to a nonprofit convention and tourist promo-
tional agency representing at least one Texas city or county;9 (d) airline in-
flight magazines (now defined as tax exempt newspapers if certain enumer-
ated requirements are met);1° (e) any item sold, leased, or rented to, or
stored, used, or consumed by, and many items sold, leased or rented by the
tribal councils and tribal businesses of the Alabama-Coushatta and Tigua
Indian Tribes; I (f) gold, silver, or numismatic coins or platinum, gold or
silver bullion if the total sales price equals $ 10,000 or more (such coins and
bullion are also exempt from use tax until subsequent transfer to a differ-
ent owner);' 2 and (g) any items sold to a nonprofit corporation formed
pursuant to the Development Corporation Act. 13 The legislature nar-
rowed the statutory sales and use tax exemption for solar energy devices,
other than a site-built solar energy device, by disallowing an exemption
unless the device meets the rating and certification standards adopted by
the State of Texas.14 Additionally, the statutory due dates and other pro-
cedural aspects of the sales and use tax were also amended by the
legislature. ' 5
The comptroller promulgated a number of sales and use tax administra-
tive rules during the survey period. Rule 3.28316 concerns the sales tax
responsibilities of bartering clubs or exchanges and their members. The
blrter of a taxable item is a sale even though trade units are accepted by
the seller instead of money. The seller in a barter exchange, which in-
cludes exchanges maintaining show or sales rooms for bartering purposes,
ordinarily must collect and remit tax on the sales price of a taxable item.
Dues and service fees charged to join an exchange and fees for maintain-
ing records on barter transactions are not, however, taxable.
5. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.419(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
6. Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 197, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 849, 850.
7. Id. § 1, at 850.
8. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 913, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5052.
9. Id ch. 470, § 2, at 2746-48.
10. Id ch. 840, § 4, at 4769-70.
11. Id. ch. 859, § 2, at 4869-70.
12. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 440, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2509.
13. Act of May 25, 1983, ch. 235, art. 7, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 983, 1038. Similar
conforming provisions were added to reflect a development corporation's exemption from
franchise tax. Id § 2, at 1039.
14. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 650, § 8, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4132, 4134.
15. See Act of June 9, 1983, ch. 281, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1362.
16. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 4558 (1982), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
673 (1983) (to be codified at 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.283).
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Rule 3.29117 was amended to allow contractors a partial credit for tax
paid on the purchase price of equipment bought for use on a taxable job
but later used on an exempt job. Moreover, contractors improving realty
for both exempt and nonexempt entities may purchase equipment tax-free
by issuing an exemption certificate. The rule also provides that the issu-
ance of separate materials and labor invoices to a customer will not change
a lump-sum contract into a separated contract if the invoices do not amend
the original contract.
Rule 3.30818 was amended on an emergency basis during the 1982
Christmas selling season and later was adopted formally. The amendment
defines computer software to include computer video game cartridges.
When computer hardware and software are purchased together, the rule
provides that sales tax is not due on the cartridges when the charge for
them is separately stated. When charges for labor or services rendered in
installing, applying, remodeling, or repairing computer hardware are sepa-
rately stated they are also not taxable. Buyers of hardware purchased ex-
clusively for resale are not liable for sales tax unless they make a taxable
use of the hardware while awaiting resale.
The comptroller issued several sales and use tax hearing decisions dur-
ing the survey period. Many of the decisions centered on sales and use tax
exemptions. In Decision 12,83019 the comptroller considered whether tem-
porary retention in Texas of pipe purchased out-of-state was subject to
Texas's storage tax. The judge upheld the tax assessment by broadly con-
struing the statutory concept of storage to include even a short retention of
property in Texas. 20
Decision 12,30521 involved the sales tax exemption for purchases and
rentals of equipment used to process certain vegetables that the petitioner
purchased from other farmers at various stages of the vegetables' growth
prior to maturity. Only an original producer is entitled to the exemption. 22
The term is defined to include "any person who performs or supervises the
day-to-day operations necessary for the growth of agricultural products
and who is at risk with regard to their success or failure . . .[but not]
persons who acquire agricultural products after they have reached matur-
ity."'23 The judge held that the exemption applied because the petitioner
acquired the products before they were fully grown.24
17. Id, 8 Tex. Reg. 1585 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 2280 (1983) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.291).
18. Id, 7 Tex. Reg. 4241 (1982) & 8 Tex. Reg. 734 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 1343
(1983) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.308).
19. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,830 (1982).
20. Id; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011 (Vernon 1982) (defining storage); cf. Shell
Pipe Line Corp. v. Bullock, No. 337343 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of
Tex.) (finding common carrier tax exemption despite for pipe line temporary storage of pipe
in Texas).
21. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,305 (1982).
22. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316(9) (Vernon 1982).
23. Id.
24. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,305, at 3.
1984]
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The issue in Decision 12,403 was whether previously taxed equipment
later used in the performance of tax-exempt contracts was entitled to tax
exemption to the extent of the value of the equipment consumed in the
performance of such contracts.25 Tne taxpayer argued that the comptrol-
ler's administrative rule, which depends upon the sequence of exempt and
nonexempt use of the equipment, was unfair. 26 When exempt use was fol-
lowed by nonexempt use no tax was due on the original purchase and only
a proportion of the equipment's value was later taxed when the use
changed. By contrast, if the equipment was used first in a nonexempt way
tax was due on its full value and any later exempt use did not result in an
offsetting credit for tax previously paid. The judge partially invalidated
the rule and declared that the taxpayer was entitled to the exemption to the
extent the value of the equipment was actually consumed in performing
the jobs.27
Decision 13,025 considered the exemption of helicopter parts purchased
for attachment to and integration into the petitioner's helicopters. 28 The
petitioner was a licensed and certified carrier of persons and property pro-
viding ferry services to offshore oil rigs and platforms. It acquired some
helicopters in an incomplete condition and completed the assembly.
Under Texas law, helicopters and repair parts are exempt from taxation.29
Most of the parts were held exempt as repair or replacement parts, even
though of higher quality than the original parts.30
Decision 12,761 involved two distinct issues. 31 The first issue was
whether sales or use tax was due on amounts received for monthly barge
rentals paid to an entity by its parent corporation. The judge rejected the
taxpayer's exemption arguments that the rentals constituted occasional
sales, 32 the transfer was between joint owners of the transferred property,33
and the rental charges were transportation fees paid after the sale of the
transported goods. 34 The occasional sale exemption, the judge held, is not
applicable when monthly rentals are involved. Also, the exemption for
transferred property was not available since the taxpayer merely shared
joint ownership of stock with its parent. The judge concluded that the
final exemption argument failed for lack of a sale or transportation of the
goods. The second issue involved the taxation of charges to purchasers of
concrete for extra time that the truck and driver had to remain at the job
site before being able to pour. The judge concluded that such standby
25. Id No. 12,403 (1982); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon 1982).
26. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (Shepard's
May 1, 1982) (amended by Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 1585 (1983),
adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 2280 (1983)); see supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussion of
amendment).
27. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,403.
28. Id No. 13,025 (1983).
29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328 (Vernon 1982).
30. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,025 (1983).
31. Id. No. 12,761.
32. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304 (Vernon 1982).
33. See id. § 151.306.
34. See id. § 151.007(7).
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time constituted a service, which was part of the sale of the concrete, and
the receipts for such time were taxable. 35
In Decision 12,507 the comptroller considered the exemption of electric-
ity predominantly used to power a computer that exclusively processed
seismic data. The taxpayer argued that the electricity was exempt because
it was used in the exploration for a material extracted from the earth. 36 If
the electricity is used predominantly in an exempt manner, all of the elec-
tricity is exempt; otherwise all the electricity used is taxable.37 The judge
determined that the term exploration must be construed broadly and,
therefore, geophysical work, of which the petitioner's computer was an in-
tegral and essential part, constituted exploration. Thus, the purchase of
electricity predominantly used to operate the computer was exempt.
The principal issue in Decision 13,251 was whether certain charges
made by the petitioner to its customers were nontaxable because they rep-
resented freight charges incurred after the sale.38 The key to determining
the taxability of the freight charges was whether more than one sale had
occurred as to each piece of merchandise. The judge concluded that two
sales occurred when the vendors invoiced and expected payment by the
petitioner, who in turn billed its clients and looked to them for payment.
The freight charges incurred by the petitioner for transporting merchan-
dise to a warehouse, where the goods were held prior to ultimate delivery
to the customer, were held to be taxable charges incurred by the petitioner
prior to sale to its customers. The decision also contained the following
guidelines for future transactions of this kind: (a) if merchandise is
shipped directly from the manufacturer/supplier to the ultimate con-
sumer's place of business or residence, any charge for freight, transporta-
tion, or handling is not taxable; (b) if the merchandise is shipped to a
public warehouse, freight, transportation, and handling charges are proba-
bly taxable; (3) if the merchandise is shipped to petitioner's warehouse in
the ultimate consumer's name, transportation and handling charges are
taxable; and (d) if the merchandise is shipped to petitioner's warehouse
under petitioner's name, the transportation and handling charges are
taxable.39
35. See id § 151.007.
36. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,507 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.317(c)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
37. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.295 (Shepard's
May 1, 1982) (exemption is based on predominant use of the electricity); see also Colonial
Cafeteria-Arlington v. Bullock, 587 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no
writ) (predominant use theory is applied when no other practical way to determine taxable
amount of electricity consumed).
38. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,251 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.007 (Vernon 1982).
39. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,251 (1983); see also id. No.
12,688. The comptroller rendered this decision approximately two months before Decision
No. 13,251, which was decided largely on the same basis. In Decision 12,688, however, the
petitioner raised the additional argument that it was the agent for its customers in taking
delivery of the purchased property from the third-party suppliers. The administrative law
judge rejected this argument and concluded that the charges upon which tax was assessed
were associated with transportation of the property before title or possession was transferred
1984]
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In Decision 12,974 the comptroller held that a taxpayer, engaged in
manufacturing prestressed concrete products used primarily in highway
and bridge construction by contractors under contract with exempt enti-
ties, is not a contractor for purposes of the statutory exemption.40 The
comptroller also strictly construed another statutory exemption in Decision
13,329.4 1 The petitioner there contended that amounts paid for bins and
containers used in the course of harvesting and processing fruits and vege-
tables, as well as amounts paid for repair parts, were entitled to tax exemp-
tion.42 The judge concluded that such bins and containers were taxable
prospectively on and after January 1, 1983. Thus, the petitioner's purchase
was not taxable because applying the tax retroactively would cause
confusion.
Decision 8,98443 involved the applicability of an exemption to pipe and
equipment purchased by a regulated pipeline company, defined as a com-
mon carrier, to construct offshore pipelines wholly outside the State of
Texas. 44 The judge concluded that the petitioner's pipe and equipment
qualified for exemption because the petitioner did not take possession in
Texas and the goods were delivered to a carrier for shipment out-of-state.
The exemption was not lost merely because the pipe was delivered to an-
other retailer for coating before delivery to the carrier, or because peti-
tioner inspected the pipe prior to delivery. The judge observed, however,
that if the pipe coater had delivered the pipe for storage to a third party as
agent for the petitioner, sales tax liability would have been triggered.
In Decision 13,106 the comptroller considered whether a hair styling sa-
lon's purchase of shampoo, hair conditioner, and hair spray were tax-ex-
empt purchases for resale or were taxable purchases because their use
changed from inventory to supplies when subsequently used on the salon's
customers.4 5 In dismissing the tax deficiency the judge relied, in part, on
statements of his own hair stylist with respect to the amount of shampoo,
hair conditioners, and hair spray that is likely to be consumed by a barber
during a given period of time.
Two of the comptroller's sales and use tax decisions during the survey
period involved refund claims. In Decision 12,55046 the taxpayer sought
to recover a portion of taxes previously paid for goods purchased to equip
its methanol production facilities. The taxpayer argued that to the extent
to the purchaser and before the property was segregated in contemplation of transferring
title or possession. No agency relationship, therefore, existed. Id at 3.
40. Id. No. 12,974 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon 1982); accord
Brazos Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Bullock, 567 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, no writ).
41. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,329 (1983).
42. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316 (Vernon 1982). This issue has largely been obvi-
ated for future transactions by the recent enactment of§ 151.333. See Act of June 19, 1983,
ch, 913, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5052, 5052.
43. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8,984 (1983).
44. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.330(a)(2) (Vernon 1982).
45. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,106 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.154 (Vernon 1982).
46. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,550 (1982).
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the equipment was used to produce methanol it was a tax-exempt solar
energy device.47 The judge determined that the exemption was unavaila-
ble on a proportionate basis. On an all-or-nothing basis the taxpayer was
not entitled to the exemption because the equipment was not used for
more than half the time as a solar energy device.
The refund claim in Decision 12,38048 turned on whether the peti-
tioner's purchase of certain printing equipment in a bankruptcy sale was
exempt from sales tax as an occasional sale. 49 The judge held that the
supremacy clause of the Constitution does not bar the imposition of a state
sales tax in a bankruptcy sale, and concluded that neither of the potentially
applicable forms of an occasional sale governed this transaction. Substan-
tially similar ownership of the equipment did not exist both before and
after the sale50 since the petitioner did not acquire all, or substantially all,
of the equipment used by the seller in a unified business activity. The
judge, however, left open the question of whether the requisite ownership
would be present if the petitioner had purchased substantially all of the
bankrupt's unified business activity and the petitioner also owned eighty
percent of the stock of the bankrupt, as it did in this case. The other form
of an occasional sale was also found inapplicable because the bankrupt's
assets were not sold in a single sale to a single buyer.5 1 The petitioner's
purchase of the equipment, therefore, was held taxable.
The comptroller considered the fraud penalty for erroneously reporting
taxable sales in two decisions during the period. In Decision 13,216 the
taxpayer argued that the tax auditor improperly sampled the taxpayer's
sales for purposes of projecting the tax deficiency.52 Since substantial dis-
crepancies existed in some records and other records were unavailable, the
judge upheld the tax deficiency based on a projection method. The tax-
payer was also subjected to a twenty-five percent penalty for fraud.5 3 De-
cision 12,91254 was essentially a factual determination regarding the
correct amount of the petitioner's taxable sales as reconstructed by the
Sales Tax Division. Of more importance, however, was the division's as-
sertion that the petitioner committed fraud by intentionally underreporting
the true amount of his taxable sales and was, therefore, liable for the
twenty-five percent penalty. 5 The division had the burden of proof on the
issue and the judge, by analogy to federal income tax law, concluded that
the burden must be discharged with clear, convincing, and substantial evi-
47. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.325 (Vernon 1982).
48. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,380 (1982).
49. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304 (Vernon 1982).
50. Id § 151.304(b)(3).
51. Id § 151.304(b)(2); Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.316(d)(4) (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
52. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,216 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 111.0042 (Vernon 1982); Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.282 (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
53. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.502 (Vernon 1982).
54. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,912 (1983).
55. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.502 (Vernon 1982).
1984]
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dence that the taxpayer intended to evade a tax he believed he owed the
state. The judge concluded that the division did not sustain its burden of
showing the petitioner's scienter and, therefore, dismissed the penalty.
The comptroller issued a number of other sales and use tax decisions
covering a wide range of topics during the survey period. The issue in
Decision 11,67456 was whether or not the petitioner was engaged in busi-
ness and, therefore, a retailer in Texas cities where it maintained no offices.
As a retailer the petitioner would be required to collect the local use tax on
any of its sales made outside of Texas but delivered to customers in those
Texas cities.57 Because the Sales Tax Division failed to show that the peti-
tioner's salesmen traveled to the subject cities, the judge held that the peti-
tioner had no such tax collection duty.
Decision 12,82258 concerned the question of whether the petitioner was
the legal successor to another's sales tax liability due to the purchase of the
business or inventory from another taxpayer. 59 The petitioner purchased
certain capital assets from the taxpayer, not including the name, goodwill,
legal rights to the business location, or the major portion of the inventory.
The judge concluded that the petitioner did not buy the business, but
warned, in a dictum, that one can purchase a business even though one
immediately changes the location and/or the name. Since the petitioner
purchased approximately twenty percent of the inventory, the judge con-
cluded that the purchase was not of the stock of goods. The judge reserved
decision, however, on whether all of the inventory or just a majority of it
must be purchased to impose successor liability for sales tax on the pur-
chaser of a stock of goods.
Decision 10,31760 involved the question of whether sales of hot oil and
vacuum units constituted the sale of a motor vehicle subject to the motor
vehicle sales tax61 rather than the sale of an attachment to a motor vehicle
subject to the general sales tax. If the motor vehicle sales tax applied, the
petitioner, as a seller, had no duty to collect that tax. 62 The judge con-
cluded that the cab and chassis purchased by a customer and provided to
the petitioner was a motor vehicle; therefore, the hot oil or vacuum unit
sold and installed by the petitioner was an attachment or accessory to that
motor vehicle. Thus, the petitioner's sales charge was subject to the gen-
eral sales tax, which the seller was obligated to collect.
Decision 13,51963 concerned the base for computing the use tax due on
the purchase of an aircraft. The judge held the proper use tax base to be
the sales price paid since the petitioner apparently intended to use the air-
craft itself. The taxpayer listed the aircraft as a fixed asset on its records,
56. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,674 (1982).
57. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.103, .107 (Vernon 1982).
58. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,822 (1983).
59. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.613 (Vernon 1982).
60. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,317 (1982).
61. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 152.021 (Vernon 1982).
62. Id. § 152.041-.044.
63. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,519 (1983).
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took a depreciation deduction for federal income tax purposes, and con-
stantly used the aircraft for business and personal purposes for a year
before demonstrating the aircraft to a potential customer. 64
In Decision 11,96465 the petitioner purchased certain items that it subse-
quently donated to a tax-exempt entity. Sales tax was neither charged by
the seller nor paid by the petitioner at the time the items were purchased.
The judge concluded that the applicable statute66 must be construed to
authorize the purchase of any item tax free as long as the item is donated
to one of the tax-exempt entities named in the statute and the purchaser
makes no intervening beneficial use of the item.
Decisions 13,30367 and 13,31768 were consolidated and considered
whether the proper taxable sales price was that shown on the petitioner's
internal records or the higher amount shown on an invoice given to the
petitioner's customers. The petitioner made carpet sales to customers who
were quoted a single lump sum price that included material, tax, and in-
stallation labor. The materials portion of the lump sum figure included the
petitioner's profit. When labor costs increased, the petitioner decreased its
profit component, thus reducing the amount used to determine sales tax.
The judge concluded that, as a result of a special statutory provision,69 the
amount shown as tax on the initial customer invoice was the full amount
owed to the comptroller, even though the true tax liability was less in the
case where the materials charge was reduced by reason of increased non-
taxable labor charges.
Decisions 13,99870 and 13,998-A 7' involved a tax protester who con-
tended that the United States Constitution prohibited the State of Texas
from accepting anything but gold or silver coins as payment of his sales tax
liability.72 The judge concluded that all United States coin and currency
was constitutionally legal tender, which the comptroller could lawfully re-
ceive in satisfaction of the petitioner's sales tax liability. Since United
States gold and silver coins also qualify as legal tender, the judge stated
that the comptroller could accept, at face value, as many of such coins as
the taxpayer would like to pay.
II. FRANCHISE TAXES
The Texas appellate courts decided no franchise tax cases during the
survey period.73 In addition, the only legislative changes made were the
64. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.101, .154(a) (Vernon 1982).
65. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,964 (1983).
66. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.155 (Vernon 1982).
67. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,303 (1982).
68. Id No. 13,317.
69. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1982).
70. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,998 (1983).
71. Id No. 13,998-A.
72. Taxpayer urged that there had been a violation of U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
73. One trial court, however, heard a significant case. In Central Power & Light v.
Bullock, No. 333,772 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial District Court of Tex., Dec.
30, 1983) the issue was whether pre-1971 federal investment tax credits and certain other
1984]
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repeal of the use of the short form for filing franchise tax reports and the
elimination of the requirement that a corporation file a signed copy of its
federal income tax return with its franchise tax report for the period end-
ing the year before that in which the franchise tax is due.
74
During the survey period the comptroller issued several new or
amended franchise tax rules. Three rules concerned foreign corporations
doing business in Texas. The comptroller amended rule 3.394, concerning
cash security deposits, to provide that after June 15 of each year, the comp-
troller will automatically refund the $500 security deposit made by a for-
eign corporation if the corporation has been in good standing for the three
previous reporting years. 75 The corporation need not apply for the refund.
The comptroller adopted new rule 3.40676 simultaneously with the repeal
of its predecessor. The new rule details specific activities that the comp-
troller deems sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to the franchise
tax.77 The comptroller amended rule 3.39578 to specify that a foreign cor-
poration must only provide a statement of county assessed property values
for accounting years ending prior to January 1, 1980. The change reflects
the elimination of the county assessed value base of the franchise tax in
1981 legislation.
The comptroller adopted rule 3.39779 concerning requests for franchise
tax reports and other information, simultaneously with the repeal of its
predecessor. As amended, rule 3.397 eliminates the small fee previously
charged for certificates of good standing and most other public franchise
tax information. Rule 3.39880 was amended by adding a provision to in-
form taxpayers that liens against corporations failing to file a franchise tax
report will be released only upon the payment of all tax, penalty, and in-
terest due. The lien is assessed in the amount of the minimum franchise
tax.
1971 federal tax credits should be included in the taxpayer's taxable surplus in calculating its
franchise tax. The taxpayer contended that these credits should be excluded because it was
required to ratably flow the credits through to its ratepayers and was, thereby, indebted to
them. The state contended that the credits were properly taxable as just another operating
expense that the taxpayer was allowed to recover from its customers. The trial court issued
no decision during the survey period.
74. Act of May 3, 1983, ch. 63, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 297.
75. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 3950 (1982), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
674 (1983) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.394).
76. Id, 8 Tex. Reg. 1332 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 3236 (1983) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.406).
77. Among some of the activities listed are: providing any service in Texas that is in the
ordinary business of the company; maintaining inventory in the state; maintaining agents in
the state to promote sales; dealing in real estate; transporting passengers or freight between
points within the state; or acting as a general partner in a general or limited partnership
doing business in Texas.
78. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 3353 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg.
3918 (1982) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.395).
79. Id., 7 Tex. Reg. 2507 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg. 3919 (1982) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.397).
80. Id., 7 Tex. Reg. 2544 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg. 3791 (1982) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.398).
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Rule 3.399,81 adopted simultaneously with the repeal of its predecessor,
concerns franchise tax exemptions. The new rule specifies procedures for
contesting the denial or revocation of franchise tax exemptions. Rule
3.399 revises the definitions of religious worship and educational purpose
corporations to conform with those used in the administration of the state
sales tax. Also, national and state banks are expressly exempted from pay-
ment of the franchise tax. Finally, the new rule establishes the require-
ments of a dissolution clause for all eleemosynary, religious, and
educational corporations.
The comptroller adopted a new rule 3.402,82 concerning limitations on
collections and refunds, simultaneously with the repeal of its predecessor.
The new rule notifies taxpayers of the change in the statute of limitations
for assessing delinquent franchise taxes from seven to four years. The rule
sets out the conditions under which interest accrues on amounts errone-
ously paid to the comptroller, and outlines the proper procedure for mak-
ing protest payments. In addition, the new rule provides for interest
payable at the rate of ten percent per year on amounts erroneously paid to
the comptroller for tax periods beginning on or after January 1, 1982.
Administrative law judges rendered a number of significant decisions
concerning the franchise tax during the survey period. Decision 12,30783
considered whether receipts from business done in Texas included adver-
tising and preprint revenues received from out-of-state customers by a
newspaper printed and published in Texas, but circulated both within and
outside the state. The amount of total Texas receipts is used in the statu-
tory formula to determine the portion of a corporation's capital subject to
state franchise tax. 84 The judge first determined that the sale of advertis-
ing is the performance of a service rather than the sale of an intangible. If
the sales were considered intangibles, the receipts would be tested under
the location of the payor standard, which treats out-of-state customer sales
as non-Texas receipts for purposes of determining the petitioner's
franchise tax liability. Since the services were performed entirely within
Texas, the judge concluded that the petitioner's franchise tax liability was
properly calculated based upon those services.
A taxpayer must be doing business in Texas to trigger state franchise tax
liability.85 The petitioner in Decision 10,87886 asserted that it was not do-
ing business in Texas because it was merely a holding company incorpo-
rated out-of-state that only received dividends and interest on its
investments in its subsidiary corporations. The judge observed that the
standard for doing business for franchise tax purposes differs from, and
81. Id., 7 Tex. Reg. 3771 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg. 4319 (1982) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.399).
82. Id., 7 Tex. Reg. 3951 (1982), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 674 (1983) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.402).
83. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,307 (1982).
84. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.103-.106 (Vernon 1982).
85. Id. § 171.001.
86. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,878 (1982).
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arguably is much broader than, the similar requirement for a certificate of
authority under the Texas Business Corporation Act.87 The judge con-
cluded that the holding company was doing business in Texas in a
franchise tax sense because the corporation engaged in the continuous pur-
suit of its business and had not entered Texas to conduct a single, isolated,
or casual transaction. The petitioner was, therefore, liable for the
franchise tax.
Decision 12,90388 considered whether intercompany charges that the pe-
titioner received from its subsidiaries were dividends rather than receipts
from services performed within Texas for the purpose of allocating the
petitioner's taxable capital. If the payments were dividends they would
only be Texas receipts when made by a Texas payor subsidiary corpora-
tion, whereas if the payments were receipts for services performed within
Texas for those subsidiaries they would be receipts from Texas business.
8 9
The judge concluded that, without evidence that the charges were for serv-
ices rendered to its subsidiaries, the charges were considered informal divi-
dends and not receipts from business done in Texas for allocation
purposes, except for dividends received from the petitioner's Texas
subsidiary.
Decision 11,78690 involved two issues. The first was whether certain
amounts credited by the petitioner to a bad debt reserve were proper re-
ductions of the petitioner's taxable capital.9 ' The judge ruled that the re-
serve accounts in question should be considered a legitimate reduction of
the petitioner's taxable capital because no distinction is made between dif-
ferent types of bad debt accounts. The second issue involved the peti-
tioner's allocation of loan servicing receipts between Texas and other
states on the same geographical basis used to distribute payroll. The judge
concluded that the taxpayer must follow the cost method, under which a
service is deemed performed wherever the costs are incurred, so long as the
performance site is immaterial to the payor of the service fee. Payroll
alone is not as representative an indicator of where services are performed
as is a method taking all costs incurred in performance into consideration.
The judge thus required the petitioner to use the cost method in the
future.9 2
Decision 11,62893 involved several issues. The first issue was whether
87. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.01B (Vernon 1980).
88. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,903 (1982).
89. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103 (Vernon 1982). Since only one of the several
subsidiaries was domiciled in Texas, only its payments to the petitioner would be Texas
receipts if the payments were dividends.
90. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,786 (1982).
91. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101 (Vernon 1982); Tex. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(b)(2) (Shepard's May I, 1982).
92. The judge further observed that the petitioner could use additional factors, such as
payroll and property, for purposes of allocating its taxable capital in future reporting periods
provided the petitioner requests and the comptroller grants permission to do so in accord-
ance with TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.108(2) (Vernon 1982).
93. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,628 (1983).
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the rental payments received by the petitioner from its subsidiaries for a
certain type of offshore drilling barge should be considered rents from
property situated in this state and, therefore, receipts from business done
in Texas for franchise tax allocation purposes.94 The judge interpreted the
word "situated" to mean within Texas borders and not in transit, and con-
cluded that the drilling rig vessel, operating in Texas waters for several
months at a time, was not in transit and, therefore, was within Texas's tax
jurisdiction. Thus, only receipts from rental of the rig when it operated in
Texas waters were Texas receipts. Another issue involved amounts ac-
crued by the petitioner for payment in the following year to its employees
as management incentive payments.95 The judge concluded that the pay-
ments, because of their discretionary nature, did not represent fixed, actual
liabilities of the petitioner and, thus, did not reduce the petitioner's taxable
surplus. The final question in the decision was whether revenue from the
sale of an offshore drilling rig still under construction must be recognized
in the year received or over the term of the financing lease. 96 The judge
held that federal income tax rules and generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples have no bearing on franchise tax treatment of income received over
a multi-year period. The entire amount of cash must, therefore, be shown
as part of taxable surplus in the year received.
At issue in Decision 12,73797 was whether management fees received
from subsidiaries for administrative work and management advice should
be considered part of business receipts for purposes of allocating the peti-
tioner's taxable capital.98 The judge concluded that the payments for serv-
ices performed by the petitioner through its own employees or third-party
suppliers were compensation that must be considered gross receipts from
services performed within Texas. The fact that the petitioner neither in-
cluded a markup nor intended to make a profit did not destroy the busi-
ness character of the receipts.
Decision 13,65299 involved a title-holding corporation, exempt from fed-
eral income tax under section 501(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code,' °°
that contended that it was also exempt from franchise tax.' 0 ' The judge
noted that the legislature had amended the applicable exemption statute
specifically to add certain federally exempt entities, and did not include
section 501(c)(2) entities. The judge concluded, therefore, that the legisla-
ture intentionally rejected a franchise tax exemption for such corporations,
and found the petitioner ineligible for the franchise tax exemption.
94. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(3) (Vernon 1982).
95. See generally id § 17 1. 101 (outlining formula for determining a corporation's taxa-
ble capital).
96. See Bullock v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 589 S.W.2d 486, 487-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,737 (1983).
98. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.103, .106 (Vernon 1982).
99. Tex Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,652 (1983).
100. I.R.C. § 501(c)(2) (1982).
101. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.063 (Vernon 1982).
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Decision 12,092102 involved a corporation's purported debt owed to its
sole shareholder/president. If the loan was a true debt it would reduce
taxable capital subject to franchise tax, but if the payment was a capital
contribution taxable capital would increase upon the corporation's receipt
of the cash without any corresponding liability. 03 Based on the peti-
tioner's documents, its federal income tax return, and its failure to accrue
interest on the alleged loan, the judge concluded that the amount involved
was additional paid-in capital for franchise tax purposes.
In Decision 12,677104 an accrual method taxpayer contended that its
year-end adjusting entries should be considered part of its books and
records for determining its taxable capital. 0 5 The judge characterized the
issue as whether the petitioner was entitled to report its financial condition
on the cash basis of accounting, giving effect to the adjusting entries made
at year end, and disregard the records maintained throughout the year on
the accrual basis. The judge rejected the taxpayer's contention and held
that the unadjusted books were the proper books and records to use for
determining franchise tax liability.
Decision 10,659 involved two principal issues.' 06 The first was when
losses on long-term construction contracts and expected recoveries on
claims filed with respect to those contracts should be recognized. The
losses would reduce taxable capital, and any recovery would partially off-
set those losses. The judge permitted the petitioner to use the percentage-
of-completion method rather than the completed contract method of ac-
counting to determine when to recognize the losses and expected recov-
eries from the contract. 10 7 The taxable capital, therefore, fluctuates yearly
depending upon the amount recognized. In another part of the decision,
however, the judge held that the elimination of the possibility of profit on
future, uncommitted sales orders was not a proper reduction of the tax-
payer's taxable capital for franchise tax purposes because the exact amount
of loss was unknown.
Decision 9,831 108 involved two major issues among several raised at the
hearing. The first issue concerned whether certain reserves maintained by
the petitioner were properly treated as debts. 10 9 The judge determined
that the reserves constituted debt and thereby reduced surplus. The judge
then considered whether advance receipts from future sales or services
properly resulted in a net increase in the taxpayer's surplus. The surplus
did not increase, the judge concluded, prior to the time the services were
102. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,092 (1983).
103. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(a) (Shep-
ard's May 1, 1982).
104. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,677 (1983).
105. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.101 (Vernon 1982); Tex. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405 (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
106. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,659 (1983).
107. See AICPA A.R.B. No. 45 (Oct. 1955).
108. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 9,831 (1982).
109. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.403(b)(24)
(Shepard's May 1, 1982).
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performed or the property was delivered since the amount by which the
taxpayer's total debts were increased offset the amount by which its total
assets were increased.
Decision 12,318110 was a very significant administrative decision issued
during the survey period. The first issue involved whether a parent's
charges to its subsidiaries for various services were reimbursements or pro-
ceeds from the resale of those services to the subsidiaries when paid to the
parent as agent for its subsidiaries. If the payments were considered reim-
bursements, they would not be business receipts for the purpose of allocat-
ing taxable capital, whereas proceeds from resales of services would be
considered to be business receipts for the same purpose."I ' Despite the
absence of a formal agency agreement between the parties, an agency rela-
tionship existed when goods or services passed from the supplier through
one corporation to its subsidiary, and the parent received the same amount
the supplier would have received directly. While the judge determined
that several items met this test, thus qualifying as reimbursements, items
such as legal retainer fees and long distance telephone services could only
be apportioned on an estimated basis to each subsidiary and, therefore,
were not eligible as reimbursements. Moreover, the judge deemed these
payments to be business receipts even though the parent had no direct
profit motive in charging a portion of its costs to its subsidiaries. The
judge observed that the petitioner's acquisition of services rather than sep-
arate acquisitions by each subsidiary enhanced the overall economic bene-
fit of the group; this indirect profit motive thus supported the view that the
receipts were business receipts.
The second issue in Decision 12,318 was whether dividends received
from a business trust, of which the petitioner owned 9.8% of the stock,
constituted receipts from business done in Texas."l 2 Because the dividends
were receipts from an intangible asset the location-of-payor test applied,
and the judge had to determine the legal or commercial domicile of the
payor trust. If the trust was domiciled in Texas the dividends would be
receipts from Texas business. 1 3 The judge rejected the petitioner's argu-
ment that the trust should be considered legally domiciled in the state
under whose laws the trust was formed and in which the declaration of
trust was recorded. The judge also rejected the petitioner's contention,
based on the applicable non-Texas law, that the act of recording the trust
was analogous to a corporation's acquiring legal domicile by virtue of a
state-issued charter or certificate of incorporation, which recognized the
corporation as a creature of that state. The trust was created, according to
the judge, by the private act of signing the declaration of trust agreement
and the act of recording the agreement was more like filing a limited part-
nership agreement, which only provides notice. Furthermore, the trust
110. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,318 (1983).
Ill. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.103, .105 (Vernon 1982).
112. See id § 171.103.
113. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 180 (Tex. 1967).
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was not recognized as a trust entity under Texas law and, therefore, was
treated as an unincorporated association. The judge noted the absence of
case law giving the test for determining the legal domicile of an unincorpo-
rated association, but concluded that courts would probably apply the
same test as that used for partnerships, which states that the legal domicile
is the location of the principal place of business. Since the trust's principal
place of business was Texas the judge found the trust to be domiciled in
Texas, and the petitioner's receipts from the trust were, accordingly, re-
ceipts from business done in Texas.
The next issue in Decision 12,318 was whether interest paid by third
party borrowers on loans, with respect to which the petitioner and others
had entered into loan participation agreements, should be treated as re-
ceipts from Texas business based upon the legal domicile of a theoretical
partnership between the petitioner and the other loan participants. The
judge rejected the position of the Business Tax Division that the loan par-
ticipation agreements constituted partnerships and, therefore, concluded
that the location of the borrower is used for determing whether or not the
interest payments are receipts from business done in Texas for franchise
tax allocation purposes. Another significant issue in Decision 12,318 was
whether the taxpayer could use the equity method of valuing its ownership
interest in certain corporations and a joint venture. The judge held, based
upon Bullock v. Enserch Corporation,'14 that any investment in a corpora-
tion, whether or not a subsidiary, must be computed at cost in calculating
taxable capital. The rule, however, did not apply to the petitioner's invest-
ment in a joint venture, which could be valued using the equity method.
The decision also addressed the issue of whether the petitioner could
reduce its taxable capital on loan losses recognized at the time of foreclo-
sure. The loss was the difference between the amount owed by a borrower
and the amount realized from the sale of the property securing the loan.
The judge permitted the reduction because the amount in questionrepre-
sented a bad debt that was certain at foreclosure. Since the law allows a
reserve for bad debts estimated to occur in the future as a reduction of
taxable capital, " 5 the judge concluded that a reduction claimed at the time
that the loss is firmly established should be recognized. The judge also
ruled on whether the petitioner's lease receipts from sale-leaseback trans-
actions should be treated as lease payments rather than loan payments for
franchise tax purposes. The judge concluded that the payments were prop-
erly characterized as lease payments subject to the location of payor test.
The last significant issue in Decision 12,318 was whether income the
petitioner realized from purchasing its own convertible debentures at a dis-
count should be considered a business receipt for franchise tax allocation
purposes. 116 The judge concluded that the increase in the petitioner's taxa-
114. 583 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
115. See Huey & Philp Hardware Co. v. Shepperd, 151 Tex. 462, 251 S.W.2d 515, 520
(1952).
116. The judge observed that the Internal Revenue Service considers the differential to
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ble capital equalled the amount saved as a result of paying less than the
original obligation on the debentures and that amount should enter into
the allocation formula. Moreover, that amount was considered part of the
business receipts allocated to Texas because the income resulted from the
petitioner's decision, in Texas, to purchase the bonds.
In Decision 13,613117 the taxpayer contended that certain amounts
credited to its Christmas bonus and contingent compensation accounts
should not be considered part of taxable capital because the amounts rep-
resented actual, rather than contingent, liabilities. The judge held that the
Christmas bonus account was not a debt since its payment was a matter of
policy and tradition, rather than a promise made to induce an employee to
come to work with the petitioner, and the amount was never specified prior
to actual payment. The judge, however, held that the contingent compen-
sation payable account was a true liability since the petitioner promised
the compensation as an inducement to employment prior to hiring and the
amount was certain once the company determined its profits at the end of
the year. Moreover, the judge held that no valid basis exists for distin-
guishing the petitioner's obligation to pay employees who were hired
based on written contracts from those hired based on oral employment
contracts.
The issue in Decision 13,676118 was whether intercompany payments
should be regarded as repayments of indebtedness and not gross receipts,
or as receipts from services performed within Texas.' 19 The petitioner, a
maritime towing company incorporated in Texas, had Texas and Louisi-
ana subsidiaries, both of which reimbursed the petitioner for the salaries of
the petitioner's officers and employees engaged almost exclusively in the
affairs of those subsidiaries. The judge ruled that for the purpose of allo-
cating the petitioner's taxable capital, the arrangement was substantively
the performance of services, not the advance of funds.
III. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A number of important cases decided during the survey period ad-
dressed points of state tax procedure. 20 In Roskey v. Texas Health Facili-
ties Commission' 2' a taxpayer grievance committee brought an action
be taxable income, and generally accepted accounting principles require such amount to be
treated as income, thus increasing the petitioner's retained earnings. Decision No. 12,318 at
3.
117. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 13,613 (1983).
118. Id. No. 13,676.
119. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103 (Vernon 1982); Tex. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.403(b)(17) (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
120. See, e.g., Brooks Operating Co. v. Bullock, No. 13,732 (Tex. App.-Texarkana,
Dec, 13, 1983, writ reftd) (unpublished opinion), in which the taxpayer paid its tax liability
and filed a written protest. The trial court sustained the state's jurisdictional plea to the
subsequent protest suit, and the taxpayer appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 112.051 (Vernon 1982) (requiring a written statement of reasons for re-
covering the tax paid under protest at the time payment is made).
121. 639 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1982).
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against a county hospital district and a hospital seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that a tax exemption certificate issued by the commission was void.
The plaintiff contended that taxpaying residents of the hospital district
would pay higher taxes as a result of the construction of a new hospital.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had not exhausted their
administrative remedies.' 22 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
on the sole ground that the taxpayers lacked standing. 23 The supreme
court's per curiam opinion reversed the court of appeals and remanded the
cause to the trial court on the basis that the court of appeals had improp-
erly placed the burden of proof as to the standing issue on the nonmoving
taxpayers. 124
Welker v. State 125 involved delinquent state employment contributions,
including interest and penalties, owed by a company acquired by Welker.
The state claimed that Welker had successor liability. 126 The applicable
statute provides that the state has made a prima facie case if its petition is
accompanied by an affidavit from the Texas Employment Commission set-
ting forth the amount due.127 If the state establishes a prima facie case, the
defendant must file a counter-affidavit denying the state's claims. While
the failure to file such a counter-affidavit generally bars the defendant
from challenging the accuracy or justness of the amount claimed in the
state's affidavit, the court of appeals held, by analogy to the operation of
civil rule 185,128 that the defendant is not precluded from raising other
defenses to his alleged liability. 129 Thus, the defendant's failure to file the
counter-affidavit in this case did not bar him from proving that the amount
alleged as due was inaccurate, and the court of appeals reversed the trial
court judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. 130 Consequently,
the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant owed the alleged amount of employment contributions and the defend-
ant has the opportunity to prove affirmatively that he was not an employer
and, therefore, not liable under the statute. 13 1
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Dickinson Independent School Dis-
trict132 the taxpayer sued to avoid assessment of ad valorem taxes on
grounds of excessiveness and discrimination. The court of appeals held
122. Id at 302.
123. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n, 630 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Austin
1982, writ granted).
124. 639 S.W.2d at 302.
125. 647 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
126. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-12(o) (Vernon 1971) (stating that any
entity acquiring another entity indebted to the Texas Employment Commission is liable for
any deficiency of the acquired company).
127. Id. art. 5221b-12(e).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185 (Vernon 1976). Under rule 185 a defendant may raise defenses
to the plaintiffs allegations even though he failed to file a counter-affidavit.
129. 647 S.W.2d at 770.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 641 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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that the school district had substantially complied with the statutory re-
quirements for tax levies and strict compliance was not required to uphold
the levy.' 33 The court also upheld the trial court's findings that the tax-
payer had not made an unconditional tender of tax due and, therefore, had
not satisfied its tax obligation for the year at issue. 134 The court also found
that the taxpayer had failed to prove that the taxing authority's valuation,
found by the trial court to reflect fair market value, was grossly excessive;
that substantial injury resulted thereby; and that the taxpayer's valuation
reflected the market value of properties within the district. 35
In Coffee v. City ofAlvin 136 property owners sued to enjoin collection of
allegedly excessive ad valorem taxes, and the taxing authority counter-
claimed to collect the delinquent taxes. The court of appeals held that the
owner's testimony was of no probative value with respect to valuation of
the subject property because the testimony was based on approximation
and was unsupported by relevant facts.' 37 Thus, although an owner of
property may give his opinion as to the property's value, the opinion must
be more than mere conjecture.
The legislature enacted several statutes during the survey period that
affect state tax procedures. The Tax Code now contains section 156.204,
regarding the hotel occupancy tax.' 38 Section 156.204 specifically requires
that the purchaser of a hotel withhold an amount of the purchase price
sufficient to pay the hotel occupancy tax due until the seller provides proof
that the tax has been paid or is not due. A purchaser failing to withhold
this amount is liable for the amount required to be withheld up to the
purchase price. The statute further provides a procedure whereby the ho-
tel purchaser may request a no tax due certificate, or a statement specifying
the amount required to be paid before the issuance of such a certificate,
and contemplates an audit of the hotel's former owner prior to the issuance
of a statement or certificate. 139 The statute of limitations with respect to
the comptroller's assessment of tax against the purchaser is four years from
the later of the date of sale or the date of determination against the former
owner.14° Moreover, at any time within three years after a deficiency de-
termination against the purchaser has become due and payable, the comp-
troller may sue to collect the delinquent amounts together with penalties
and interest.' 4 '
The legislature clarified that the general provision for ten percent inter-
est on all delinquent taxes also applies to delinquent motor vehicle sales
and use taxes.' 42 A forfeiture penalty is assessed for failure to file a report
133. Id. at 306.
134. Id. at 308.
135. Id. at 309-10.
136. 641 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 601.




142. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 93, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 450, 450.
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or pay the motor fuel tax when due. 4 3 The legislature imposed a similar
forfeiture penalty with respect to the motor vehicle sales tax, the tobacco
products and cigar tax, the cement production tax, miscellaneous gross re-
ceipts tax, miscellaneous occupation taxes, the gas production tax, the oil
production tax, the sulphur production tax, and the inheritance tax;' 4 4 and
provided similar penalties for assessments due with respect to public
utilities. 14 5
The legislature established certain limitations on the collection and re-
funds of state taxes and the filing and release of state tax liens. 146 First, the
comptroller and a taxpayer may now agree on extending the period for
filing a refund claim in the same manner as previously provided for ex-
tending the period for assessment and collection of the tax. Second, a
pending administrative proceeding before the comptroller regarding the
same period and the type of tax is not considered in determining the expi-
ration date for filing a refund claim. A taxpayer cannot file a refund claim
for the same transaction, type of tax, or time period as a refund claim
previously filed with the comptroller. Third, the comptroller is now au-
thorized to pay the customary fee to a county clerk for filing and indexing
a release of tax lien notice and to collect the amount paid from the tax-
payer against whom the lien was filed. Fourth, the legislation provides
that the protest payment required prior to filing suit for a refund must be
made before the later of the expiration of the statute of limitations for
filing a refund claim or six months after a jeopardy or deficiency determi-
nation becomes final.
Under new legislation, the general interest rate on judgments and the
period for which judgments earn interest do not apply to judgments earn-
ing interest under title 2 of the Tax Code. 147 Moreover, the state is entitled
to interest at the rate of ten percent a year on judgments it wins in tax
cases. The interest begins on the day the judgment is signed and ends on
the day the judgment is satisfied.148
The requirement that a taxpayer consent before a sample audit can be
performed by the comptroller's auditors has been repealed. 149 Under prior
law consent was not required if the taxpayer's records were inadequate or
insufficient. 150 New legislation now provides that, in addition to other
remedies provided by law or by city ordinance for the collection of the city
hotel occupancy tax, the city attorney or his designee may sue persons re-
143. Id. § 2, at 450-51.
144. Id. §§ 3-13, at 451-56.
145. Id § 14, at 456-57.
146. Id ch. 94, at 458.
147. Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 107, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 518, 518-19; see TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. tit. 2 (Vernon 1982) (state taxation).
148. Id. § 2, at 519.
149. Act of May 25, 1983, ch. 234, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 982. The comptroller has pro-
posed an amendment to rule 3.282 to conform to this change. See Tex. Comptroller of
Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 4119 (1983) (proposed amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.282).
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.0042 (Vernon 1982).
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quired to collect the city hotel occupancy tax to enjoin the operation of a
hotel in the city until payment is made or the report is filed. ' 5' The legisla-
ture amended the Property Tax Code by changing the due date for the
filing of annual tax reports. Collectors for taxing units must now submit
reports accounting for collected and delinquent property taxes within sixty
days after the close of the unit's fiscal year.'5 2
The legislature also made several changes to the due dates for oil and
gas production taxes, motor fuel taxes, gross receipt taxes, and the reports
and estimated payments in connection with those taxes.' 53 The time and
manner that motor vehicle tax collections and tax receipts must be sent by
county tax assessor-collectors to the comptroller were also amended. 154
The comptroller changed several of the administrative rules governing
tax procedure. During the survey period the comptroller significantly
amended rules 1.1 to 1.42.155 In general, the new procedures require a
taxpayer to submit documented and detailed formal objections to a defi-
ciency determination at a very early stage in the administrative redetermi-
nation proceeding. 156
The comptroller formally adopted new rule 3.6,' 57 concerning subpoe-
nas of third-party record keepers, after the rule's initial adoption on an
emergency basis. The rule allows the comptroller to subpoena a taxpayer's
records from any person in possession of them. The new rule fixes the
reimbursement rates payable to third-party record keepers who comply
with subpoenas, and provides a procedure for requesting payment. Under
this rule, the comptroller will reimburse record keepers for time actually
spent in locating, retrieving, copying, and compiling requested records. 5 8
No reimbursement, however, is made for managerial or legal work ex-
pended in determining whether to comply with a subpoena.
The comptroller adopted rule 3.55,159 which authorizes the payment of
interest at ten percent per year on tax erroneously paid for reporting peri-
ods after January 1, 1982. The interest appends automatically to amounts
refunded and need not be requested. Interest begins to accrue sixty days
after either the payment date or the due date of the tax report, whichever is
later. Interest stops when credit is allowed by the comptroller or within ten
days prior to issuance of the refund warrant.
151. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 1009, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5421, 5421.
152. Id ch. 1027, § 1, at 5461, 5462.
153. Act of June 9, 1983, ch. 284, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1375.
154. Id ch. 280, at 1360.
155. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 1653 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
2810 (1983) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN, CODE §§ 1.1-.42).
156. For a discussion of the operation of the procedural rules prior to amendment, see
Sherman, Proceduresfor Handling a Tax Redetermination Controversy with the Comptroller
of Public Accounts, 46 TEX. B.J. 732 (1983).
157. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 619 (1983) & 8 Tex. Reg. 670
(1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 1072 (1983) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.6).
158. The rate of reimbursement is $6.00 per hour.
159. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 3056 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex.
Reg. 3790 (1982) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.55).
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IV. INHERITANCE TAX
The Texas courts decided no inheritance tax cases during the survey pe-
riod. The legislature, however, made several important changes to the ad-
ministration, collection, and enforcement of the inheritance tax, the due
dates for filing certain returns and paying taxes, and the liability of certain
persons. 160 First, the due dates for state inheritance tax returns and pay-
ments are coordinated with the due dates for federal generation-skipping
transfer taxes. Previously, coordination was limited to the federal estate
tax return and tax. Second, a Texas tax return need not be filed if no
federal estate or generation-skipping transfer tax return must be filed.
Third, the state no longer holds an automatic tax lien as of the date of
death, thus eliminating the need for a no tax due certificate from the per-
sonal representative of the estate. Fourth, the statute provides that any
personal representative of a decendent's estate who transfers any of the
decedent's property without paying the inheritance tax, penalty, and inter-
est is personally liable for such amount to the extent of the property's
value.
The comptroller issued only two inheritance tax administrative decisions
during the survey period. Decision 12,818161 involved a taxpayer claiming
a deduction on the inheritance tax return for property received from a
prior decedent whose estate paid another state's estate tax. The deduction
for such property is allowed if an inheritance tax has been paid. 62 The
decision concluded that payment of an estate tax on the property is
deemed to be payment of an inheritance tax for purposes of the statute.
The taxpayer, therefore, was entitled to the deduction for the property.
The issue in Decision 12,819163 was whether the valuation of a land
transfer made in contemplation of death should be reduced by the amount
of federal gift tax paid on the transfer prior to the decedent's death. 164 The
gift of the property was made in contemplation of death; therefore, the
estate corpus subject to inheritance tax included the property transferred.
The fact that the donees had agreed to pay the gift tax on the original
transfer did not reduce the market value of the subject property. The
judge thus refused to allow reduction of the property's value by the federal
gift tax paid.
160. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 90, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 439.
161. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,818 (1982).
162. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 211.051(b) (Vernon 1982). This provision in the Tax
Code refers to a death tax, which is specifically defined in § 211.001(2) to include an estate
tax, rather than an inheritance tax. The predecessor statute, Act of Sept. 1, 1959, ch. 1, art.
14.10, 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 187, 327, repealedby Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 862, § 6, 1981 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3291, 3294, which was at issue in Decision 12,818 did not expressly define an
inheritance tax to include an estate tax.
163. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 12,819 (1982).
164. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 211.051(b) (Vernon 1982). This hearing involved Act
of Sept. 1, 1959, ch. 1, art. 14.11, 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 187, 327 (repealed 1981); this issue




The survey period was a bountiful time for developments in Texas prop-
erty taxation. The United States Supreme Court issued two significant de-
cisions in the property tax area.' 65 InAmerican Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas
County 166 the Court struck down the Texas property tax on bank shares.
Several Dallas-area taxing subdivisions levied property taxes on the value
of banks' shares of stock. In determining that value, the taxing authorities
included the value of United States obligations held by the banks. The
banks contended that the property tax violated federal law, which gener-
ally exempts federal obligations from state and local taxes. 167 The Court
agreed, holding that the plain meaning of the federal exemption statute
forbade any form of taxation and, therefore, the property tax could not
stand. 168
In Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris169 the Supreme Court considered the
validity of imposing personal property taxes on copying machines assem-
bled in Mexico from United States manufactured parts, shipped to and
temporarily stored in a customs bonded warehouse in Houston prior to
sale, and finally shipped to Xerox affiliates in Latin America. None of the
copiers were sold to customers for domestic use. Instead, the products
were under the continuous control and supervision of the United States
Customs Service from the time of entry into the warehouse until clearance
at the port of shipment. Xerox prevailed in the trial court on the grounds
that the taxes violated the import-export clause 70 and the commerce
clause 17 of the United States Constitution.172 The Houston court of civil
appeals reversed, holding that neither constitutional provision had been
violated, and the Texas Supreme Court denied Xerox's application for a
writ of error.' 73 The United States Supreme Court, over Mr. Justice Pow-
ell's lone dissent, reversed the Texas appellate decision and held that the
taxes were an impermissible violation of Congress's comprehensive regula-
tion of customs duties.' 74 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found it unnec-
essary to consider whether the taxes would have been permitted under the
import-export or commerce clauses.
The issue in Hays Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero
Transmission Co. 175 was whether the taxpayer had properly challenged the
taxing authority's valuation of the taxpayer's property. The court of ap-
165. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 103 S. Ct. 3369, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072
(1983); Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 103 S. Ct. 523, 74 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1983).
166. 103 S. Ct. 3369, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1983).
167. 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976).
168. 103 S. Ct. at 3380, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1085.
169. 103 S. Ct. 523, 74 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1982).
170. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
171. Id § 8, cl. 3.
172. 619 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Id. at 407. For discussion of the case at the appellate court level, see Stark, Taxa-
tion, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 571, 588-89 (1982).
174. 103 S. Ct. at 528, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
175. 645 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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peals reversed the trial court and found that the taxpayer had not shown
that the assessment was excessive, as required by the applicable statute.' 76
The court stated that the taxpayer had a greater burden to carry in this
case because it had delayed its attack on the assessment until after the
board of equalization had approved the tax rolls and begun collection.177
In Highland Church of Christ v. Powell' 78 the taxpayer argued that the
part of a building in which it conducted a radio and television ministry
was exempt from property taxation. 79 The court of appeals held that the
portion of the building used for the radio and television ministry was prop-
erly exempted from property taxation because it was exclusively used for
religious worship within the meaning of the applicable statute. 80 The
church, however, was denied an exemption for certain years because it had
failed to file for the exemption.' 81
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Midland Independent School District8 2 was
another case regarding the proper valuation of the taxpayer's property for
taxing purposes. The railroad asserted, and the court of appeals agreed,
that the taxing authorities' use of comparable sales to establish market
value was illegal, arbitrary, and fundamentally wrong. 83 The court stated
that the taxing units should have used the cost and income approaches in
determining value, as authorized by the Texas Supreme Court. 84
Querner Truck Lines v. State 185 was an action brought by a taxpayer to
enjoin the sale of its property after seizure for delinquent taxes. The
supreme court, on direct appeal of the district court's denial of the injunc-
tion, upheld the statute under which a taxpayer who renders his personal
property with the county tax assessor is assured that it will be assessed at
the value listed on the tax rolls or that he will have ten days' notice to
appear before the board of equalization to contest any increase.' 86 The
supreme court's holding was based upon its earlier decision in a compan-
ion case, Shaw v. Phillips Crane & Rigging of San Antonio, Inc. 187
A suit for delinquent ad valorem taxes in Manges v. Freer Independent
176. Id. at 549-50; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7329 (Vernon 1960) (repealed eff.
Jan. 1, 1982); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41 (Vernon 1982) (detailing taxpayer's
right to protest appraised value of property).
177. 645 S.W.2d at 547 n.1.
178. 644 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a) (Vernon 1982).
180. 644 S.W.2d at 181. The relevant exemption statute is TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20
(Vernon 1982).
181. 644 S.W.2d at 182.
182. 647 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
183. Id. at 64-65.
184. Id The Texas Supreme court authorized the cost/income valuation in Polk County
v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1977), and Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. City
of Dallas, 623 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. 1981).
185. 652 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1983).
186. Id at 368; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7266 (Vernon 1960) (repealed eff. Jan. 1,
1982, and recodifed at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.21(b) (Vernon 1982).
187. 636 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1982). For a discussion of this case, see Stark & Slocum,
Taxation, Annual Survey ofTexas Law, 36 S. L.J. 403, 414 (1983).
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School District 188 resulted in several holdings by the court of appeals.
First, the independent school district involved was held to lack constitu-
tional authority to levy ad valorem taxes because of the manner in which
the school district was formed.' 89 Moreover, this constitutional deficiency
could not be cured by a legislative enactment. Next, the court held that the
school district was not entitled to collect attorneys' fees in this litigation. ' 90
Furthermore, the court held that a bulk lien upon multiple properties of
multiple defendants is a violation of the Texas Constitution' 9' and the ap-
plicable property tax statute. 192 Accordingly, the court set aside as void
the foreclosure sought by the taxing authorities. 93
The legislature made a number of technical and relatively minor
changes to the Property Tax Code during the survey period. 194 The comp-
troller repealed rules 3.231 to 3.256,195 relating to state ad valorem taxes,
because a constitutional amendment repealed state ad valorem taxes.' 96
The Board of Tax Assessor Examiners also adopted a comprehensive set of
administrative rules during the survey period to conform to the statutory
amendments made by the legislature.197
The attorney general issued several significant opinions relating to the
property tax during the survey period, including the following: (a) no ad-
ditional fifteen percent penalty is available if a county attorney collects
delinquent property tax;198 (b) the chief appraiser must give homestead
designation to a residence for up to twenty acres of land; 199 (c) state park
188. 653 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
189. Id. at 558.
190. Id. at 564.
191. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
192. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7172 (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1979).
193. 653 S.W.2d at 567.
194. See, e.g., Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 1007, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5419 (tax exemption
for lands dedicated to higher education and used for housing purposes); id. ch. 896, at 5002
(loss of tax exemption requires proration of tax to reflect time when exempted); id. ch. 905,
at 5033 (attorneys fees on judicial appeal increased to $5000 or 20% of taxes); Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 412, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207 (new exemption for galleries and museums). In
addition, the rules for determining the property tax situs for vessels and other watercraft
(and movable property generally) were materially changed. Act of June 16, 1983, ch. 353
§§ 1-5, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1907. A property owner may now prevail in a protest based on
the property's situs by showing either that the property is not taxable in this state or, alterna-
tively, that it is subject to another Texas district's appraisal (in the latter situation, the chief
appraiser of the district in which the property owner prevails must now notify the appraisal
office of the district in which the property owner has established situs). Act of June 19, 1983,
ch. 906, §§ 1-3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5034.
195. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 956 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
1495 (1983) (repealing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.231-.256).
196. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1-e.
197. Board of Tax Assessor Examiners, 8 Tex. Reg. 2183 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
3144 (1983) (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 621.1); see also Act of June 19, 1983,
ch. 980, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5329 (amending the Texas Assessors Registration and Profes-
sional Certification Act).
198. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-14 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.07 (Vernon
1982).
199. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-40 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.13, .45
(Vernon 1982).
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land concessions are not exempt from property taxation;2°° (d) the statu-
tory limitation on property valuation increases for reappraisals between
1982 and 1983 violates the constitutional requirement for equal and uni-
form property taxation;20 1 (e) property owned by a nonprofit corporation
that provides employment training and assistance to ex-offenders is not
tax-exempt because the organization is not assisting handicapped persons
(interpreted to refer to persons with physical or mental impairments that
place such individuals at a disadvantage in economic competition); 20 2
(f) the property tax exemption accorded to nursery products is constitu-
tional inasmuch as Texas courts would construe tax-exempt farm products
to include such items; 20 3 (g) a home owned by a church and used by a
needy family is not tax-exempt under any tax provisions;204 and (h) an
appraisal district must impose penalty and interest on a taxing unit's late
payment of taxes to the district.20 5
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur20 6 the city annexed an oil com-
pany's offshore drilling platform and leasehold. The oil company claimed
that the annexation was a taking without due process in violation of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 20 7 In addition to
several procedural holdings, the court expressly held that the annexation
of the oil company's property and the resultant tax assessed upon it vio-
lated constitutional due process.20 8 The court stated that:
Port Arthur's annexation was nothing more than a land grab, moti-
vated solely by a lust for tax revenue and having no relation to the
traditional purposes of municipal government and its legitimate pow-
ers. . . . The disparity between the tax imposed and the benefits re-
ceived was clearly so flagrant and palpable as to amount to an
arbitrary taking of property without compensation. 20 9
The district court, therefore, declared the annexation ordinance unconsti-
tutional and ordered the annexation set aside. 210
State v. Allstate Insurance Co. 211 was an action to recover an alleged
overpayment of taxes levied upon gross insurance premiums received on
policies covering property or risks located in Texas during the preceding
200. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-59 (1983).
201. Id No. JM-43; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § I (amended 1978).
202. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-543 (1982);see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(c)(i)(C)
(Vernon 1982).
203. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-583 (1982); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.16 (Vernon
1982).
204. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-553 (1982).
205. Id. No. JM-74 (1983); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.06(e) (Vernon 1982).
206. 553 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
208. 553 F. Supp. at 518.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 654 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
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year.212 The court of appeals held that the insurance carrier paid the tax
under duress.213 Specifically, the carrier feared that the state Board of In-
surance and the Commissioner of Insurance might terminate the com-
pany's right to do business in Texas if it did not conform to the
interpretation assigned to the tax statutes by the board and the commis-
sioner and submit the overpayment.
In Christian Jew Foundation v. State 2 14 the court of appeals extensively
analyzed the federal and state constitutional and statutory requirements
for tax exemption of a church. The tax at issue was the employer's contri-
bution to the unemployment compensation fund administered by the
Texas Employment Commission. 21 5 The court held that the foundation,
which propagated its belief generally through written publications and ra-
dio broadcasts and was not formally affiliated with a specified sect or de-
nomination, was nevertheless a church eligible for exemption from
contributing to the unemployment compensation fund for services per-
formed by its employees.216
United States v. Texas 217 considered the applicability of the gallonage
tax on alcoholic beverages purchased by military bases from nonresident
sellers.218 The Fifth Circuit held that the federal government exercises ex-
clusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves under the supremacy clause219
and Texas, therefore, was not allowed to prohibit purchases directly from
nonresident sellers. 220 Accordingly, the military purchasers were not sub-
ject to the gallonage tax.22' A few additional miscellaneous tax cases were
decided or appealed during the survey period, and a variety of miscellane-
ous tax legislation was enacted. 222
The legislature made a very important change to motor vehicle sales and
use taxes. Those taxes no longer apply to the retail sale of a motor vehicle
that is not used in Texas prior to being transported out of state.223 In addi-
212. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 4.10 (Vernon 1981).
213. 645 S.W.2d at 47.
214. 653 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
215. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5221b-5 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp. 1971-
1983), 5221b-7 (Vernon 1971).
216. 653 S.W.2d at 617; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(g)(5)(E) (Vernon
Supp. 1984).
217. 695 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1983).
218. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 201.03(a) (Vernon 1978).
219. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
220. 695 F.2d at 141.
221. Id.
222. See Dorchester Gas Producing Co. v. Bullock, No. 13672 (Tex. App.-Texarkana,
Nov. 15, 1983) (not yet reported) (involving whether the taxpayer was a producer of hydro-
carbons subject to gas production tax); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Bullock, No. 282075 (Dist. Ct.
of Travis County, 361st Judicial Dist. of Tex., Dec. 7, 1982) (concerning the Texas gross
receipts tax on gas utilities). Among the more important legislative changes were the follow-
ing: (1) no longer will a state warrant (payment) be issued to anyone owing delinquent state
taxes until such taxes are paid. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 100, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 499;
and (2) the occupation taxes on brokers and factors, quotation services, pistol dealers, ship
brokers, and billiard table owners or operators were repealed. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 840,
§ 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4769.
223. Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 722. Subject to further interpre-
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tion, the comptroller adopted or proposed several miscellaneous changes
to his administrative rules during the survey period. Most of these were
technical in nature. The comptroller revised rule 3.14,224 which provided
an exemption from the gas occupation tax for certain royalty interests, and
rule 3.33,225 concerning the taxability of tank bottoms under the crude oil
production tax.226 To alleviate the otherwise accelerated reporting re-
quired by a combination of certain statutes applicable to the sulfur pro-
duction tax, 227 the comptroller adopted rule 3.42 on an emergency basis. 228
The comptroller initially adopted new rule 3.54,229 concerning the gross
receipts tax applicable to telegraph business within Texas, but later pro-
posed it for repeal because clarifying legislation made this rule unneces-
sary.230 The comptroller also adopted rule 3.56,231 concerning telephone
company business within Texas to clearly identify business within Texas
that is subject to the gross receipts tax on telephone companies.232 For
example, receipts from the lease or rental of telephone equipment located
in Texas and from access charges for connecting this type of equipment to
communication lines are taxable unless either the sender or receiver of a
communication is outside Texas.
New rule 3.113 authorizes interest to be paid on refunds of cigarette tax
at the rate of ten percent per year if the tax is erroneously paid to the
comptroller. 233 Refunds for reporting periods prior to January 1, 1982, will
tation by the comptroller, the literal language of this legislation would permit an out-of-state
customer to purchase an automobile from a Texas retail dealer free of sales tax on the repre-
sentation that such purchaser would immediately drive the vehicle to the purchaser's home
outside of this state. So long as the purchaser represented to the seller that he would make
no use of the vehicle other than to drive it to the out-of-state location the retail seller could
properly sell the vehicle free of tax. To prevent the foregoing amendment from being used
as a subterfuge for defeating the motor vehicle sales tax, however, the new legislation further
provides that if a vehicle that was purchased tax-free under these provisions is brought back
into Texas for use on the public highways of this stale, a use tax is imposed on the operator
at the time the vehicle is brouht back into Texas. This tax is imposed apparently without
regard to whether the vehicle is registered in Texas. The legislation does not indicate how
the amended provision is to be enforced.
224. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 670 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
1072 (1983) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14). Tex. Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 11,660 (1982) invalidated the tax allocation method used in the earlier version
of the rule.
225. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 1483 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
2761 (1983) (amending 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.33). The rule now provides additional
guidance for determining the taxable value of salvaged or reclaimed oil.
226. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 202.051 (Vernon 1982).
227. Id. §§ 203.101, .052.
228. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 3729 (1983), adopting on an
emergency basis 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.42.
229. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 890 (1983) (to be codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.54). t
230. Id, 8 Tex. Reg. 3614 (1983) (proposing to repeal 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.54); see
Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 168, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 723.
231. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 891 (1983) (to be codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.56).
232. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 182.061-.064 (Vernon 1982).
233. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 3056 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg.
3790 (1982) (to be codified. at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.113).
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not accrue interest. After January 1, 1982, interest begins to accrue on the
later of either sixty days after the date of payment or sixty days after the
due date of the tax report. Interest stops when credit is allowed by the
comptroller or within ten days before the date the refund warrant is issued.
Credits taken on the taxpayer's return do not accrue interest and no tax or
interest will be refunded to a person who has collected the tax from an-
other until the amount collected is first refunded to the party from whom it
was collected. 234
The comptroller amended rules 3.161 to 3.164,235 regarding the hotel
occupancy tax,236 to clarify certain terms in connection with the complete
revision of the rules relating to this tax. The comptroller repealed rule
3.171,237 concerning special purpose liquefied gas propelled motor vehicles
to conform with the repeal of the related statute.238 The comptroller also
repealed rule 3.177 relating to certain certificates of deposit deposited in
lieu of cash or surety bonds as security for certain fuel tax permits. 239 Rule
3.181,240 concerning cargo tank calibration, no longer requires that taxpay-
ers obtain the comptroller's permission before using meters to measure the
volume of liquid placed in, or removed from, a vehicle cargo tank. The
comptroller proposed rule 3.485 for amendment to reflect the legislative
change to the motor vehicle tax on manufactured housing,241 and adopted
the bingo tax rules, rules 3.541242 and 3.544 to 3.553,243 on an emergency
basis to provide detailed guidance to taxpayers in light of recent legislative
changes to the bingo taxes.244
During the survey period the Texas Attorney General issued one impor-
tant miscellaneous tax opinion, stating that the hotel occupancy tax applies
to state employees traveling on state business. 245 Finally, the comptroller is
234. Similar refund provisions were adopted for the cigar and tobacco tax and the hotel
occupancy tax. See id, 7 Tex. Reg. 3057 (1982), adopted, 7 Tex. Reg. 3790-91 (1982) (to be
codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.128, .166).
235. Id, 8 Tex. Reg. 314 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 1027 (1983) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.161-.164).
236. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 156.051 (Vernon 1982).
237. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 671 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg.
1072 (1982) (repealing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.171).
238. Act of June 16, 1981, ch. 752, § 13(e), 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2783.
239. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 7 Tex. Reg. 4521 (1982), 8 Tex. Reg. 731
(1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 1495 (1983) (repealing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.177). Prior to
its repeal the rule required that a person who desired to assign a certificate of deposit to the
comptroller in lieu of a cash or surety bond as security for a gasoline or diesel fuel permit
must submit the certificate of deposit, as well as the assignment, to the comptroller. The
repeal of the rule will allow the submission of only the assignment with respect to a certifi-
cate of deposit held by a broker or savings and loan association.
240. Id, 8 Tex. Reg. 732 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 1495 (1983) (amending 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.18 1).
241. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 96, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 463; Tex. Comptroller of Public
Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 4268 (1983) (proposing to amend 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.485).
242. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 8 Tex. Reg. 4392 (1983) (amending on an
emergency basis 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.541).
243. Id at 3345, 3469 (amending on an emergency basis 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.543-
.553).
244. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 575, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3443.
245. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-528 (1982).
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now required to publish the maximum credit against the gasoline tax al-
lowable for the first sale or use of gasoline and alcohol mixture blended
from products produced in a state allowing a reciprocal credit for Texas
produced products.246
246. Act of June 9, 1983, ch. 287, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1425. The comptroller's Fuels
Tax Division made that determination for the first time effective for Sept. 1983. See 8 Tex.
Reg. 2441 (1983).
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